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ABSTRACT
The rise in microarchitecture side-channel attacks has significantly impacted
the realm of hardware security today, and has left sensitive applications vul-
nerable to a wide set of attack vectors. It is crucial to develop effective
and comprehensive mitigation strategies to protect vulnerable applications
against these attack vectors. Recently, there has been a surge of efforts to
defend against such attacks through data-oblivious programming, but no
work exists today to transform “unsafe” COTS binaries into data-oblivious
binaries. Achieving data-oblivious COTS binaries is challenging due to their
complex nature and lack of clean abstractions. However, such a feat is nec-
essary because many COTS binaries are already deployed in production and
run on outdated vulnerable microarchitectures.
This paper builds BinCloak, the first framework that can automatically
transform x86 COTS binaries into side-channel resistant data-oblivious bi-
naries. We do this by defining a data-oblivious program representation for
program binaries, and implementing techniques to construct this representa-
tion and transform it into a data-oblivious binary. Finally, we show BinCloak
can transform a wide range of applications, and is the first to transform large
complex binaries of real-world cryptography applications such as Libgcrypt’s
RSA implementation.
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A central security threat to modern processors is microarchitectural side
channel attacks [1]. These attacks exploit how software interacts with hard-
ware, specifically that a program’s (measurable) hardware resource usage
over time is often private data-dependent. There is a wide range of attack
vectors that span from measurements of program execution time [2] to hard-
ware resource usage through a variety of hardware structures such as the
cache memory [3, 4, 5, 6], virtual memory [7], TLB [8], load-store queue be-
havior [9], DRAM [10], branch predictor [11, 12], port contention [13], and
so on (e.g., [14, 15, 16, 17]).
Given the various hardware structures through which to leak secrets, it is
clear that defenses must be holistic and robust with respect to which hard-
ware structure will be monitored to infer private data. In this direction, there
is a rich literature on data-oblivious programming [14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 33, 35, 36, 37]. In a nutshell, the idea
is to write programs using a limited, restrictive semantics such that hardware
resource usage is independent of private data. For example, load/branch in-
structions must take public/non-sensitive operands, which makes memory
subsystem activity (e.g., the cache, TLB, DRAM) a function of public infor-
mation only. The techniques proposed for data-oblivious programming span
the stack, ranging from domain-specific languages [34, 35], to source- (e.g.,
[14]), to compiler- (e.g., [22]) to ISA-level (e.g., [32]).
Yet, there is a critical piece missing in the literature, namely that no
existing work considers data-oblivious code generation given access to only
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) binaries. COTS binary-level transforma-
tions are critical because of the nature of software and hardware today. On
the software side, programs are compiled once and typically have a long shelf
life, longer than a processor generation in many cases. On the hardware side,
microarchitectural side channels are microarchitecture-specific, e.g. some mi-
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croarchitecture can have data-dependent integer division or floating point
optimizations [38], while others might have compressed caches [39], etc.
Putting these together, we need a way to retrofit binaries deployed in pro-
duction as new microarchitectural vulnerabilities are discovered, and given
the various microarchitectures on which binaries are expected to run. We
correspondingly fill this gap by developing BinCloak, a novel framework that
automatically transforms an insecure COTS binary to a data-oblivious COTS
binary.
Achieving a data-oblivious COTS binary is challenging. First, binary dis-
assembly (and analysis) is hard and incomplete, even for state-of-the-art
tools, and especially for a variable-length ISA like x86. Even after disassem-
bly, recovering program abstractions (e.g. loops, conditionals, variable types)
at the binary level is difficult and imprecise because, unlike source code, bi-
naries lack these clean abstractions. In addition, there are problematic ab-
stractions that are much harder to analyze and rewrite to be data-oblivious
at the binary level, such as recursive functions.
To circumvent the above challenges, the key insight that enables our ap-
proach is that while COTS binaries do not have well-defined semantics, it is
possible using program analysis to construct a best-fit between the binary’s in-
tended behavior and a safe semantics, and to apply known techniques to pro-
tect the best-fit solution. Specifically, we define a data-oblivious intermediate
representation called the Data-Oblivious Program rEpresentation (DOPE)
which has similar, restrictive semantics as language-based prior work [35, 34]
(e.g., well-defined scope, no recursion, etc.). We first use a combination of
static and dynamic binary analysis techniques to map actually-encountered
program constructs ( recursion, etc.), given a set of program inputs, to the
DOPE semantics. We then rewrite the binary to satisfy these semantics, re-
sulting in a “DOPEified” data-oblivious binary. Finally, we apply these
transformations on a set of benchmark applications that form the core of
many real-world applications (e.g., binary search, bubble sort, etc.), similar
to prior work [22, 32], as well as the COTS binaries of real-world cryptog-
raphy implementations OpenSSL’s T-Table AES and Libgcrypt’s RSA to
harden them against microarchitectural side channels.
In summary, this we make the following contributions:
1. Implement the first framework for automatically transforming
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COTS to data-oblivious binary, BinCloak, which takes in a COTS
binary, disassembles it, constructs its DOPE and transforms it into a
data-oblivious version.
2. Implement new program analysis transformations that con-
struct the DOPE using a combination of static and dynamic binary
analysis techniques. These transformations enable BinCloak to handle
fundamental program abstractions, such as loops and recursion, that
prior work [22, 34] could not.
3. Evaluate on real-world applications and cryptography implementa-
tions of T-Table AES and RSA. We show that BinCloak is able to
transform all these applications into data-oblivious binaries using a
small set of inputs for analysis, despite incurring 15x-80000x perfor-
mance overheads and 4x-7000x size overheads depending on the appli-




2.1 Microarchitectural Side Channel Attacks
Microarchitectural side-channel attacks enable a co-located or remote ad-
versary to infer program secrets by monitoring execution time or hardware
resource usage [1]. There are several classes of attacks that directly reveal
different program behaviors. For example, monitoring hardware structures
related to the memory subsystem (the cache [3, 4, 5, 6], virtual memory sys-
tem [7], TLB [8], load-store queue behavior [9] and DRAM [10]), enable an
attacker to learn program memory address pattern at several granularities
(e.g., cache line-granularity [3], word granularity [9, 5]). Likewise, monitoring
branch predictor state and execution unit port contention [11, 12, 13] reveals
program control flow. Further, several optimizations such as variable latency
arithmetic [14, 15] reveal the data passed to arithmetic instructions. Many of
these attacks require that the attacker only share physical resources with the
victim (e.g., Prime+Probe and the cache [40, 3] or Drama and the DRAM
row buffer [10]), as opposed to sharing virtual memory with the victim (e.g.
[4]).
There are two types of ways applications may leak secrets through these
microarchitectural side-channels, (1) through secret-dependent control flow
or (2) by secrets flowing into “unsafe” instruction operands (e.g., addresses
of memory loads, variable latency arithmetic) that can be monitored by the
aforementioned attacks. In many cases, secret-dependent control flow can in-
directly reveal different program behaviors given the attacker’s public knowl-
edge of the program. For example in if (secret) *0xdeadbeef, observing
that the memory access pattern includes 0xdeadbeef reveals secret.
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2.2 Data-Oblivious Programming
Data-oblivious programming is a way to write programs that makes the pro-
gram’s microarchitectural resource usage independent of its sensitive inputs,
blocking microarchitectural side channels described in Section 2.1 [19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 14, 18, 33, 34, 32].1 In a nutshell,
data-oblivious programming means writing or executing programs using sim-
plified “safe” semantics that mitigate known attack vectors. Such semantics
include, for example, restricting programs to be written using simple arith-
metic (to avoid variable latency functional units), loads with public addresses
(to avoid memory-based side channels) and branches with public predicates
(to avoid control flow-based attacks) as discussed in Section 2.1.
2.3 Binary Analysis and Recompilation
A common first step in binary analysis is to parse the binary format to
identify the different sections, e.g., code and data sections. The next step
is to disassemble the code section(s) to interpret raw bytes in the binary as
instructions of the ISA. In general, disassembling a binary compiled for a
variable-length ISA, such as x86, is undecidable [42]. Prior work [43] has
developed two techniques—recursive descent and linear sweep—that work
well on compiler generated binaries. We refer the reader to [44] for a detailed
study on complexities of binary analysis on architectures such as x86. After
analysis, modification of binaries to rewrite them to be data-oblivious is also
challenging. A number of binary rewriting tools have been developed with
different degrees of generality and performance [45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51].
1This line of work is similar conceptually to MPC compilers [36, 37, 41], but with a




This chapter reviews our threat model assumptions, formal definitions of
security and the implications of those definitions on whole program security.
3.1 Threat Model
We consider the setting where a victim binary runs on a shared resource ma-
chine in the presence of adversarial software. The program itself is considered
public. The processor hardware is trusted to be implemented correctly from
a functionality perspective, but contains hardware resources that are utilized
by programs in data-dependent fashions, e.g., processor caches.
Security goals. The adversary’s goal is to learn private data in the victim
program through microarchitectural side channels (Section 2.1), for example,
private inputs contributed by another party or secret program state (e.g., a
cryptographic key). Our approach is capable of blocking all non-speculative
microarchitectural side channels. In this work, we demonstrate using our
approach to block all leakages through secret-dependent control flow and
“unsafe” operands of memory instructions for the second type of leakage
described in Section 2.1. Other instructions with unsafe operands can be
handled similar to memory instructions by using a point transformations
approach or through data-oblivious arithmetic libraries [14], and thus we
leave it for future work. That said, Section 3.2 defines several security models
that trade-off security and performance, considering different classes of the
attacker.
Security non-goals. This work does not consider hardware attacks such as
power analysis [52] or EM emissions [53]; nor does it consider compromised
manufacturing (e.g., hardware trojans [54]) or denial of service attacks. We
also do not consider speculative execution attacks [16].
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Adversary privilege level. Our work can tolerate both user-level (Ring-
3) and supervisor-level (Ring-0) software-based attackers. As in other works
that utilize data-oblivious programming (e.g., [32]), security against a supervisor-
level attacker further requires the victim binary to run within a trusted exe-
cution environment that provides virtual isolation, such as Intel’s SGX [55].
3.2 Security Definitions
Our security goal is confidential input data privacy, formalized as:
Definition 3.1 (Confidential input privacy). Given a program λ with Public
(non-sensitive) input x and Confidential (sensitive) input y,
View(µArch(λ(x, y))) = X = {X0, X1, . . . , XM} represents the program’s
observable execution trace (projected through function View) when running
on a processor µArch. What information is contained in each Xt (for each
time step t) depends on the observability function View. W.l.o.g. we will treat
x and y as fixed-size arrays, thus λ can accept an arbitrary number of Public
and Confidential inputs. Privacy for the Confidential inputs then requires:
∀x ∈ DataP , ∀y, y′ ∈ DataC :
View(µArch(λ(x, y))) ' View(µArch(λ(x, y′)))
where ' denotes computational indistinguishability, and DataP and DataC
denote the space of Public and Confidential inputs, respectively.
That is, what the attacker can see cannot be secret-dependent and should
remain a function of public data only. What the attacker can see is defined
through the observability function View. Microarchitectural side channel-
based attackers imply a rich view that captures fine-grain behavior related
to the program’s execution. Below we define two common Views that we
protect against. In what follows, we abbreviate Definition 3.1 for a given
view View and microarchitecture µArch as Oblivious [View, µArch].
Definition 3.2 (PC observability: program instruction granularity). Given
a program execution λ(x, y) and instruction address space Aλ of program λ,
PC(µArch(λ(x, y))) = X = {X0, X1, . . . , XM} where Xi = α ∈ Aλ is the PC
value of the i-th dynamic instruction of the execution λ(x, y).
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Definition 3.3 (Mem observability: memory access granularity). Given a
program execution λ(x, y) and program memory space Mλ of program λ,
Mem(µArch(λ(x, y))) = X = {X0, X1, . . . , XM} where Xi = (opi,mi) for
opi ∈ [read, write] and mi ∈ Mλ is the i-th memory operation, to memory
address mi, of the execution λ(x, y).
Definition 3.2 models an adversary that can, directly or indirectly, observe
the sequence of program counter (PC) values for a given program execu-
tion. We say a program λ is PCSecure on a processor µArch if it achieves
Oblivious [PC, µArch]. Orthogonally, Definition 3.3 models an adversary that
can observe a program’s memory state at read/write memory operation-
granularity. Thus, a program λ that achieves Oblivious [Mem, µArch] is said
to be MemOblivious (or Memory Trace Oblivious [56]). In both cases, we
only consider the non-speculative models of PCSecure and MemOblivious.
This work’s goal is to transform a COTS binary into a binary that is both




Converting arbitrary COTS binaries to be data-oblivious introduces several
new challenges. At a high-level, the root-cause of these challenges can be
split into two distinct categories:
(C1) Imprecision in abstractions recovered from binaries, and
(C2) Problematic programming constructs in COTS binaries.
In this chapter, we discuss these challenges and motivate the need to solve
them through examples from a real-world cryptographic implementation:
Libgcrypt’s RSA, which also serves as a case-study for BinCloak later in
the evaluation.
(C1) Imprecision in abstractions recovery prevents existing source-
based solutions to be directly applicable to binaries. Unlike source code,
binaries lack clean abstractions, e.g., functions, conditionals, switch state-
ments, loops, variables, and types, as these are stripped away during the
compilation process. Take for example a switch statement: a source-code
based solution can reason about a switch statement like a conditional (an
if-else ladder). However, a binary lacks such an abstraction. Most modern
compilers implement a switch case through a combination of a table of code
pointers and an indirect jump. Statically recovering some of these abstrac-
tions is possible, but such analysis is fundamentally limited in soundness and
precision. To illustrate this problem, consider an analysis to infer the bounds
of a loop. On one hand, if the analysis is not sound, then certain inputs to
the applications may not complete without leaking secret information. On
the other hand, if the analysis is imprecise, then the resulting binary per-
forms more work than necessary, incurring a larger performance overhead.
Any system to secure COTS binaries needs to be aware of imprecisions in
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(a) Source Code (b) Compiler Generated Code
Figure 4.1: Merge Sort Call Graph.
abstraction recovery to ensure that the security property is upheld despite
these imprecisions.
(C2) Problematic abstractions in COTS is due to several program-
ming constructs that are difficult to automatically rewrite to be constant-
time. In our application of BinCloak on Libgcrypt, we encounter several
such programming constructs that cannot be handled by existing techniques.
For example:
1. Recursive Functions: Recursive functions is another way a loop may be
introduced in a program. However, unlike a traditional loop, recursive
functions do not have a strict structure of a natural loop, e.g., well
defined loop headers and exit conditions, and require inter-procedural
analysis to track information flow making them harder to analyze com-
pared to a loop. Additionally, compilers optimizations may introduce
another layer of complexity to analyzing recursions. Consider for ex-
ample a standard merge-sort implementation as shown in Figure 4.1.
2. Strongly Connected Components (in callgraph): Generalizing recursive
functions further, the functions in the callgraph may form an SCC,
thereby allowing certain sections of the code to be repeated an arbitrary
number of times. We observe this code pattern occurs in Libgcrypt,
shown in Figure 4.2, in the core part of code that is responsible for
modular exponentiation. To make analysis harder, there are multiple
points of entry into the SCC.
Prior work disallowed the use of problematic programming constructs, e.g.,
unbounded loops, recursions. This is reasonable for a source-based solution
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Figure 4.2: Libgcrypt RSA Multi-Entry SCC.
as programmers can rewrite their code to be amenable with their system.
However, binary-based solutions need to solve these hard problems and gen-
erate functional binaries to be useful, as end-users cannot modify applications
to fit the frameworks’ requirements. In the following chapters, we describe
how we design BinCloak to overcome these challenges and rewrite COTS






The main goal of BinCloak is to synthesize data-oblivious binaries directly
from COTS binaries by turning them into a functionally equivalent super-
sequence of program instructions. The super-sequence of instructions ex-
hibits no secret-dependent control flow, achieving straight line code (SLC)
when executed on any input, and the values of observable instruction operands
(as per Definition 3.2 and 3.3) are concretized, together satisfying both
Oblivious [PC] (PCSecure) and Oblivious [Mem] (MemOblivious). The super-
sequence also guarantees program correctness, whereby for every program in-
put there exists a sub-sequence of instructions that can execute the program
correctly on that input. To achieve program correctness while executing the
entire super-sequence correctly for a given input, we use execution masking
logic, which selectively allows only the instructions in the input-dependent
sub-sequence to update program state.
To construct the super-sequence of program instructions we need to un-
derstand the complex nature of binaries and their programming constructs,
then transform them into well-defined data-oblivious abstractions that can
be disassembled into a static sequence of instructions. Thus, we define the
DOPE, a data-oblivious representation of a program binary that defines and
uses data-oblivious abstractions to efficiently represent the program’s super-
sequence. The DOPE is an automaton-like language that encodes all possible
program control-flow paths, memory accesses and instructions metadata into
a single, concise representation. The DOPE for a program is sufficient to con-
struct a super-sequence of SLC instructions that, when integrated with the
proper execution masking, can be executed securely for all program inputs.
In the upcoming sections, we define the semantics of the DOPE and show
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how to transform the necessary binary programming constructs into DOPE
semantics for both PCSecure in Section 5.2, and MemOblivious in Section 5.3.
5.2 PC-Secure Semantics
1 int x = 0, y = 5;
2 if (secret)
3 x = y // Leak
(a) PC Leaked
1 int x = 0, y = 5;
2
3 x = (secret) ? y : x;
(b) PC Secure
Figure 5.1: PC Secure vs Insecure.
In the PCSecure model, the attacker can observe the set of program counter
(PC) traces for a program. We consider the most powerful attacker under
this model by assuming that the attacker can simply get the full program ex-
ecution trace. Using these traces, the attacker can identify secret-dependent
control flow variations across traces and leak the secret. For example, in Fig-
ure 5.1a the attacker will learn the value of secret depending on whether
the PC of Line 3 is in the trace or not. Therefore, to achieve PCSecure, the
observed program execution trace should be independent of the secret input
to the program. Said another way, the program super-sequence cannot ex-
hibit branching behavior dependent on the secret input. As such, the DOPE
semantics for PCSecure are constructed from a sequence of data-oblivious
abstractions with secret-independent ordering that achieve SLC.
DOPE Semantics Figure 5.2 shows an overview of DOPE’s grammar. The
DOPE is a hierarchical program representation, with every subsequentia level
in the hierarchy representing a program at a higher level of granularity. The
representation is rooted at the start symbol, P, which denotes what follows
is the representation for the entire program. The DOPE views the program
as a flattened sequence of functions and basic blocks with strict, static and
secret-independent ordering.
The second level of granularity encodes the flattened representation of the
program’s callgraph, where every element is either a non-recursive function
Fn, or a recursive strongly connected component SCC. To capture repeating
programming constructs such as loops and recursion, the DOPE defines a Rep
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〈P〉 ::= 〈Fns〉
〈Fns〉 ::= Seq 〈Fns〉 〈Fns〉
| FnName: 〈Fn〉
| SccName: 〈Scc〉
〈Scc〉 ::= Rep count 〈Fns〉
〈Fn〉 ::= Seq 〈BB〉 〈Fn〉
| Rep count 〈Fn〉
| 〈BB〉
〈BB〉 ::= Seq 〈Inst〉 〈Inst〉
| 〈Inst〉
〈Inst〉 ::= Inst, 〈metadata〉
Figure 5.2: PCSecure Hierarchical DOPE Grammar.
count wrapper, which is a fixed secret-independent value that sets an upper
bound on any looping construct in the program. Then, the definition for an
SCC is simply a Seq of one or more Fn wrapped in a Rep count.
The next level of granularity defines the structure of a program function,
Fn, which is either a Seq or Rep (for loops) of BBs that represents the se-
quence and repetitions of a function’s basic blocks that are required to exe-
cute the function obliviously. Finally, the last level of granularity represents
program instructions (Inst) with their metadata, and atomic sets of instruc-
tions called basic blocks (BB).
To generate the DOPE, we will analyze the different programming constructs
that impact the program PC, and demonstrate the necessary transformations
needed to encode these constructs in the DOPE semantics. Namely, we ana-
lyze the direct and indirect branching of program binaries, as well as loops,
recursions and SCCs, and map them to the grammar in Figure 5.2.
Direct Control Flow To achieve PCSecure, we need to eliminate all
branching behavior within the executable, and convert the program execution
into SLC. However, control flow information is fundamental for determining
the input-dependent sub-sequence of instructions and achieving program cor-
rectness. We maintain the branch targets (e.g. true target, false target) in
the metadata of control flow instructions, where it is later used to implement
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the execution masking logic that updates program state.
Indirect Control Flow There are two types of indirect control flows:
indirect calls which impact the sequence of Fns, and indirect jumps which
impact both sequences of Fns and BBs. To properly account for all possible
program paths, we need to resolve (and concretize) indirect control flow
targets and construct a set of all possible concrete target addresses. The
DOPE then reduces these indirect control flow instructions to a sequence of
direct control flow instructions, each to an address in the set of concrete
target addresses.
Ordering Branching instructions enable program components, such as ba-
sic blocks and functions, to be laid out without a strict ordering in the
binary. Consequently, when branching instructions are eliminated, program
instructions will not be laid out in their topological order, which hinders
program correctness. Therefore, we topologically sort the sequence of Fns
that represent program P, as well as the BBs of each Fn, ensuring that the
super-sequence of instructions constructed using the DOPE will have proper
ordering.
Loops and Recursion In the case of program loops, a sequence of basic
blocks may repeat for a secret-dependent number of iterations. To mitigate
this, and generate a secret-independent sequence of BBs that ensures the cor-
rect functionality of a program for all possible inputs, we bound the number
of iterations to a conservative upper bound that ideally satisfies all inputs. As
a result, any input that requires the execution of the loop for fewer iterations
than the upper bound can be executed correctly. Recursion is another way
of introducing loops within the program execution, thus we simply reduces
a recursive function into one big loop over all the function BBs.
Mutual-recursion Mutual-recursion is a general case of recursion: when
one function, say foo, calls another function, say bar, which eventually calls
function foo again. To handle mutual recursion, we transform the pair of
functions into a single function by combining their basic blocks, effectively
transforming the mutual recursion case to a simple recursion.
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Figure 5.3: Multi-Entry SCC Reduction Step.
Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Generalizing mutual-recursion,
a set of functions, F = {F0, F1, . . . , Fn}, forms an SCC in the program call-
graph if every function in the set is reachable from every other function
through a sequence of one or more function calls. This means that the set of
functions F forms a loop. Mutual-recursion, then, is an SCC of size 2.
If the SCC has a single-entry point, i.e., exactly one of the functions in F
(say F0) is called from a function that is outside F, then we can reduce it to
mutual recursion by considering F0 to be the recursion head, and merging
all functions with F0 first and {F1, F2, . . . FN} in their topological order into
a single function. If an SCC has multiple entry points, we first reduce it to
an SCC with a single entry point by introducing a fake dispatch function
and re-routing all calls into the SCC to the dispatch function, which is then
responsible for calling the actual target functions. Figure 5.3 illustrates the
reduction of the most general multi-entry multi-exit SCC case into a simple
single-entry single-exit recursion.
5.3 Memory Oblivious Semantics
In the MemOblivious model, we assume that the attacker can observe
at a fine granularity the series of memory accesses (loads/stores) and the
addresses that these memory accesses touch. As such, the observable address
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1 bufB = malloc(secret);
2
3 access(&bufB); // Leak
(a) Base Explicit Flow
1 if (secret) {
2 bufA = malloc(50);
3 }
4 bufB = malloc(100);
5
6 access(&bufB); // Leak
(b) Base Implicit Flow
1 off = secret & 0xff;
2 addr = &buf + off;
3
4 access(addr); // Leak
(c) Offset Explicit Flow
1 if (secret) {
2 addr = &buf;
3 } else {
4 addr = &buf + 4;
5 }
6
7 access(addr); // Leak
(d) Offset Implicit Flow
Figure 5.4: Memory Secret Leakage.
operand of memory instructions needs to be secret-independent. In general,
secret input can influence (and leak through) the address operand in two
ways: (1) by impacting the memory allocation state and influencing object
locations in memory and (2) by using the secret input to determine which
object to access.
To illustrate how the secret input can leak through the memory allocation
state, consider the examples in Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b, where the address
accessed is always the first element in bufB. In both examples the value of the
secret influences the memory allocation state, either by determining the size
of the allocation for bufA or whether bufA is allocated or not. This secret
dependent state will determine the base address of bufB, thus revealing the
value of the secret when bufB is accessed.
On the other hand, Figure 5.4c demonstrates how the value of the secret
can be used directly to compute the address (explicit flow), while Figure 5.4d
demonstrates how it can indirectly influence the address through influencing
the program control flow (implicit flow). Even though the PCSecure model
ensures that both branches are taken to prevent revealing to an adversary
the value of secret, the secret-dependent state of addr must be maintained
by BinCloak, using the execution masking logic, for program correctness.
Thus, the memory access observed by an attacker on Line 7 reveals the value
of secret.
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To achieve MemOblivious, we identify all memory objects possible across
different inputs, eliminating the secret-dependent allocations. Then we trans-
form each memory access into a sequence of all possible accesses to these fixed
memory objects. We will need to extend the PCSecure DOPE grammar to de-
fine this data-oblivious view of program memory and the necessary metadata
needed to obfuscate and concretize the observable memory instruction ad-
dress operand.
〈Mem〉 ::= List 〈MemObj 〉




〈metadata-site〉 ::= Map (instance −→ 〈MemObj 〉)
〈metadata-access〉 ::= Set 〈MemAcc〉
〈MemAcc〉 ::= Tuple (〈MemObj 〉, offset)
Figure 5.5: MemOblivious DOPE Grammar.
DOPE Semantics This extension is shown Figure 5.5. The DOPE views
program memory as a list of memory objects MemObj, each defined by a
type (global, stack, or heap) and a fixed size. For each memory alloca-
tion site (e.g., malloc), the DOPE encodes metadata that maps each dynamic
instance of this site to the MemObj it creates. The DOPE also encodes a set
of concrete memory access locations MemAcc (a.k.a. memory address set), for
each memory instruction, represented by a memory object MemObj and the
offset into that object. In the following paragraphs, we will show how to
transform memory allocations and accesses to construct these data-oblivious
abstractions.
Memory Allocation State As defined by the DOPE, program memory is
categorized into three separate regions, [Globals,Stack,Heap], each serving
its own purpose. The lifetime of memory objects in a program depends on
the region they reside in. A memory object, MemObj, allocated as a global
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is live throughout a program’s execution, i.e., its addresses are always valid,
and cannot leak information about their allocation state. However, an object
on the stack is live as long as the function that allocated the object is on the
current call stack, and an object allocated on the heap, e.g., through explicit
calls to malloc or new, is live as long as the corresponding pointer is not freed.
The main difference between allocations on the stack and heap is that objects
on the stack are allocated and deallocated implicitly, through manipulation
of the stack top register at function prologue (or entry) and function epilogue
(or exit), and are accessed relative to the value of this register. Heap objects,
in contrast, are allocated/deallocated through calls to a memory allocator,
e.g., malloc/free, and the memory addresses are constructed relative to
the sequence of these calls. To satisfy the DOPE semantics, and achieve a
static view of program memory where there is a fixed number of MemObj
with concrete addresses and sizes, we must eliminate the dynamic nature of
heap and stack memory.
To overcome the dynamic nature of the stack and be able to construct a
memory address set that is independent of the stack top register, we treat
the stack as a single allocated stack MemObj with a base equal to the initial
value of the stack top register, i.e. its value at the start of the program, and
a size equal to the largest seen stack depth. Since the initial value of the
stack top register is independent of the secret input, it is enough to represent
an access to a stack MemObj by an offset value relative to the stack object
base.
To handle dynamic allocations on the heap, we reduce the heap to the
stack case by requiring that all heap objects be pre-allocated at the start of
program execution. To achieve this, all allocated heap objects and their sizes
must be predetermined and fixed to an upper bound. The DOPE maintains the
mapping of a dynamic instance of an allocation site to its corresponding heap
MemObj in the metadata-site. In this way, a predetermined pointer address
value to a pre-allocated heap object is returned at every dynamic instance
of an allocation site, and thus concrete addresses can be constructed for
accesses to these objects. To prevent information leakage through freeing of
heap allocated memory, all frees are deferred to the end of the program.
Memory Accesses With a data-oblivious memory allocation state, mem-
ory instructions now access objects in memory at fixed addresses. However,
19
different dynamic instances of the same memory instruction may access dif-
ferent memory objects, and different offsets inside these objects, in a se-
cret dependent way. To eliminate this dependency, we identify the possible
MemAccs across every dynamic instances of a memory instruction, and use
them to construct the memory address set metadata-access for that instruc-
tions. Using these address sets, it is sufficient to convert every memory
access in the program into a sequences of data-oblivious accesses to concrete
addresses. Then, similar to the PCSecure model, the execution masking
logic ensures that only the memory access to the intended memory location




Figure 6.1: BinCloak Implementation Pipeline.
BinCloak’s implementation is split into two phases: (i) the frontend, which
is responsible for construction of the DOPE of a binary, and (ii) the backend,
which interprets the DOPE and rewrites the original binary to satisfy the DOPE
semantics. In this chapter, we will discuss briefly the implementation of these
two phases, along with their different components as illustrated in Figure 6.1.
The current implementation of BinCloak is for x86-64 binaries, but may be
extended to support other ISAs through additional engineering efforts.
6.1 Frontend
The frontend uses a combination of static and dynamic analysis to recover
abstractions and create the DOPE. At a high-level, the implementation uses
angr [57] for static analyses, e.g., disassembly, control flow graph, callgraph
construction etc. As for dynamic analyses, it uses Intel PIN [58] to gener-
ate (i) instruction PC traces, and (ii) memory traces: allocations (malloc,
free, and realloc) and memory accesses.
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6.1.1 Static Analysis
The static analysis processes the binary and constructs an initial, unparam-
eterized DOPE, i.e., a DOPE with unbounded loops, incomplete CFG, and no
memory address set information.
Disassembly and CFG BinCloak uses angr’s CFGFast with default op-
tions to generate the CFG, callgraph, function identification, and disas-
sembly. Where such information from angr may not be accurate enough,
BinCloak implements a mechanism to load information from more advanced
static disassembly tools such as IDA Pro [59].
Loop Identification The generated control flow graphs are used to iden-
tify strongly connected basic blocks in a function’s control flow graph using
Tarjan’s algorithm [60] (implemented as a part of networkx, a popular graph
library in Python). This set of basic blocks form a loop. Once identified,
basic blocks in the loop are identified as loop headers (entry points) and exit
nodes. This above procedure is repeated recursively on the identified loop to
further break it down and identify subloops.
Recursion and SCC Similar to loop identification, the constructed call-
graph is used to identify SCCs within the callgraph (a recursion is simply a
special case of SCC of size 1). As outlined in Chapter 5, any loops or SCCs
with multiple entry points are canonicalized to have a single entry point.
6.1.2 Dynamic Analysis Annotations
To supplement the information from static analysis, BinCloak uses the gen-
erated traces to fill in the gaps in the DOPE generated by static analysis. The
end result is a DOPE that completely specifies the behavior of the application
and is used by the backend to generate a new, data-oblivious binary.
Binary Input and Trace Generation BinCloak has multiple strate-
gies to generate inputs to the binary under test: (S1) using a greybox fuzzer,
afl [61], (S2) reading fixed number of bytes from a source of randomness, e.g.,
/dev/urandom. In our experiments, the two strategies performed identically
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as the input format and parsing are extremely simple. BinCloak defaults to
(S2) while optionally allowing (S1). The generated inputs are then used to
execute the binary using Intel-pin tool to generate execution traces.
In the following steps, the dynamic analyses operate on the traces generated
from the above steps. At a high-level, these analyses proceed in two-steps,
analogous to the well-known map-reduce paradigm: (i) In the map-step, the
analysis operates on each trace independently and in parallel to generate
on a per-trace basis information for every analysis site. (ii) In the reduce-
step, analysis information generated across all traces is aggregated on a per-
analysis site basis (e.g., generated bound information for a single loop) to
form the final analysis output.
Loop and Recursion Bounds The analysis scans through the instruction
PC trace, a list of basic block addresses in execution order, till it hits a head
of a loop L (or recursion/SCC head) as identified by the static analysis. This
initializes the loop counter for L to 1. Every time the head of L is hit, the
counter is incremented. If the loop exits, identified by loop exit locations in
the static analysis, the current counter is saved. For every instance of loop
L in the current trace, the largest of such counters is saved. Similarly, the
reduce step assigns the maximum of counters for L across all the analyzed
traces.
For recursion (and SCC), rather than computing the bounds directly, the
analysis computes the recursion the maximum depth by emulating the call
stack during the analysis and choosing the largest across all analyzed traces.
The maximum recursive depth is then used to derive the loop bounds. In
this way, our implementation can conservatively handle all recursive calls
with a certain depth, rather than a maximum number of recursive calls. The
derivation is based on the observation that if a recursion has a maximum
depth of d, and r (r > 1) recursive call sites, then the number of possible
nodes in a complete recursion tree of depth d is r
d+1−1
r−1 . Additionally, since we
need an additional execution of the function for every call site and node in the
recursion tree that is not a leaf to perform the unwind step of the recursion,




CFG and Callgraph Completion For every indirect control flow site,
the observed set of targets is recorded on a per-trace basis. In the reduce
step, we take a union of targets observed across all traces to generate the
final set of targets for a site. The control-flow, callgraph, and the DOPE are
updated by adding edges to the newly identified targets.
Memory Analysis The analysis scans through the memory trace while
keeping track of the current heap state: memory object allocations, deallo-
cations, and reallocations. Then, at every memory dereference, the address
accessed by the instruction is mapped to the memory object accessed. Then,
a MemAcc tuple of (MemObj, offset within memory object) is recorded by
the analysis. Mapping addresses to objects requires information about base
and bounds of every allocated object. This is readily available for heap al-
located objects as the analysis tracks calls to standard memory allocator
functions. For the global and stack, we do not require accurate sizes of mem-
ory objects as we treat each access as an access to a new memory object in
the corresponding regions. Lastly, in the aggregate step, the analysis takes a
union over all observed tuples at every instruction, de-duplicating entries as
need be. To get around the problem of memory randomization and ASLR,
objects are always referenced with respect to an anchor location that is in-
variant of randomization:
• Global objects are referenced relative to the section base the global
section is loaded at.
• Heap objects are referenced using a tuple of allocation site, and a ver-
sion number, i, indicating the ith call to malloc from that site.
• Stack objects are referenced relative to the initial stack-pointer value:
the stack-pointer value when execution hits a user-controlled function
for the first time, after all of the boilerplate libc initialization. This
is usually the main for most programs, but may be configured within
BinCloak to be otherwise.
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6.2 Backend
The backend interprets the high level semantics of the DOPE and lowers it
down to the program binary level. It uses the DOPE’s data-oblivious abstrac-
tions to construct a super-sequence of instruction and rewrite an “unsafe”
COTS binary into a data-oblivious one. The backend primarily instruments
and rewrites a binary in two ways: it augments the binary with a new mem-
ory region and it manipulates the binary’s text (i.e. code) section, leaving
everything else untouched (i.e. global memory, symbol tables, etc.). Our
objective for this work is to produce a proof-of-concept binary as a baseline
implementation, and not to develop techniques to optimize the rewritten
binary - we leave such optimization techniques for future work. For binary
rewriting, we use RetroWrite [45], a static instrumentation tool for COTS x86
binaries that allows us to disassemble the binary and add instrumentation as
if it were inserted at compile time.
6.2.1 BinCloak Memory Regions
To satisfy the DOPE semantics we introduce and instrument three new mem-
ory regions: a volatile ScratchPad (V-SP), a non-volatile ScratchPad (NV-SP)
and a Shadow Stack (SS). The V-SP and NV-SP are both statically allocated
regions. The V-SP is used to store global and temporary variables (e.g. for
saving program state) that are typically secret-dependent and change values,
sometimes secret-dependently, throughout the execution. In contrast, the
NV-SP is used to store secret-independent constant meta-data provided by the
DOPE (e.g. loop bounds, memory address sets) that do not change through-
out program execution. The third memory region, the SS, is a dynamically
growing memory region (similar to the program stack) which keeps track of
secret-independent program state (e.g. secret independent call stack). Both
the NV-SP and SS are memory regions that only store program metadata




Binary DOPEification is the process of rewriting the structure of the binary’s
code and transforming it to the desired data-oblivious straight-line code
structure represented in the DOPE. We start at function granularity, where for
each function we identify its basic blocks and re-order them according to the
topological order indicated by the DOPE. We then construct SCCs by merging
the basic blocks of SCC member functions in the order indicated by the DOPE
under a new symbol name (i.e., the dispatcher), and modify all function calls
to any of the SCC member functions to point to this new symbol.
At basic block granularity, we instrument looping instructions around each
collection of basic blocks enclosed within a Rep in the DOPE, for example,
all basic blocks in the new SCC function. Each looping construct has an
associated loop bound stored in the NV-SP. For each dynamic instance of a
loop at runtime, the looping construct loads the loop bound onto the SS, and
uses this SS loop variable to evaluate, decrement and iterate around the loop
basic blocks.
6.2.3 Transactions
1 void Transaction(Instruction I, ProgramState S) {
2 ProgramState new_S = I.execute(S);




Figure 6.2: High-Level Transaction Pseudocode.
In order to keep the program state consistent with the correct execution
while executing every instruction in the super-sequence, we implement exe-
cution masking logic to conditionally update program state. To implement
this logic, we use the concept of transactions, an instruction wrapper that
executes the instruction and then conditionally updates the program state by
masking away the effects of the executed instructions that are not supposed
to be executed.
To build these transactions, we introduce the notion of a public program
counter (PCpub) and a private program counter (PCpriv). The PCpub is the
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Table 6.1: Instruction Transaction Types.
Type Transaction Description Updated
State
CF Instructions Eliminates branching behavior and emulates










Eliminates early termination behavior (e.g.






Saves and conditionally restores memory, reg-
ister and flags state. A special case of early
termination (segfaults), also sets PCpriv to ⊥






Replaces memory allocation to return a pre-
allocated heap pointer and sets PCpriv to ⊥ if
no object found.
PCpriv, REG
program counter value that is observable to an attacker, i.e. the rip register
in x86-64. To make the program secret independent, it is simply enough
to ensure that the sequence of PCpub values during a program executing is
independent of the secret input. On the other hand, the sequence of PCpriv
values during program execution follows the sequence of PC values that is
observed during the correct, corresponding to program semantics, execution
of the original program. The PCpriv value is stored in the V-SP and is not
observable to an attacker.
We then have two parallel worlds during the program execution: (1) the
PCpub that follows the SLC program execution and moves along sequen-
tially (secret-independently) as determined statically by the DOPE, and (2)
the PCpriv that semantically and secret-dependently moves along the correct
program execution. Using the abstractions of PCpub and PCpriv, a transaction
can simply be reduced to check if the transaction condition PCpub == PCpriv
holds at every instruction execution. This allows the instruction execution to
update the program state if so, otherwise masking away its effects if not. Up-
dating program state includes updating PCpriv to ensure forward progress.
We provide the high-level pseudocode of a transaction in Figure 6.2, and
categorized transactions into five types in Table 6.1. In the following sec-




To implement a transaction, we need to execute the instruction normally,
and then conditionally update program state depending on the transaction
condition. We achieve this by storing the program state that will be affected
by the executing instruction onto the V-SP, executing or emulating (e.g.
branching behavior) the instruction, and finally conditionally reverting the
affected program state if the transaction condition does not hold. Conditional
updates to program state are done using the data-oblivious x86-64 cmov
instruction, which not reveal any information about the branch predicate
[22]. We use this technique to implement PCSecure transactions for the
different types of transactions in Table 6.1, and show their pseudocodes in
Figure 6.3. We implement transactions for most x86-64 integer and SSE
(used for SIMD applications) instructions. We do not handle floating point
instructions as this can be simply done by replacing them with LibFTFP’s
[14] data-oblivious implementations, and we leave this for future work.
Compute Transactions Figure 6.3a shows the parameterized transaction
around a compute instruction (e.g. add, shl, mul) that evaluates registers
%rsrc and/or %rdst, and stores the result in the destination register %rdst.
Since computer registers typically modify both the destination register %rdst
and the flags state register %rflags, we temporarily store their values on the
V-SP (lines 4-5) and then execute the instruction (line 8).
To check whether we need to restore program state, we check the transac-
tion condition by comparing PCpriv and PCpub (line 12), and then condition-
ally restore the values of %rdst and %rflags (lines 13-15) if the condition
does not hold. However, comparing PCpriv and PCpub modifies program flags
and overwrites the impact of the instruction execution (line 8) on %rflags.
Therefore, for instructions that modify flag state, we need to save %rflags
(line 11) after executing the instruction and conditionally commit it to pro-
gram state after evaluating the transaction condition (line 15). Note that we
always save %rflags before executing the instruction because, to check the
transaction condition, comparing PCpriv and PCpub modifies them.
Memory and Early Termination Transactions Many memory and
























































































(d) Control Flow Instruction
Figure 6.3: Parameterized PC-secure Transaction Pseudocodes.
Parameters are denoted inside square brackets [], indicating instruction operands
(e.g. source/destination, registers, memory locations) or instruction modes (e.g.
jump mode). Variables that start with a %r are registers, a dot (. or inside ()
are memory locations, .vsp are V-SP memory locations, and $ are constants.
For illustration purposes, we use register %r8 and %r9 whenever temporary
registered are needed.
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flag state, thus restoring %rflags is simple and unconditional as seen Fig-
ures 6.3b and 6.3c. For memory instructions that do impact %rflags,
such as compute instructions with memory locations as source or destination
operands, we simply combine the pseudo-codes of Figures 6.3a and 6.3b.
These transactions, however, exhibit early termination behavior (e.g. di-
vide by zero, segmentation fault, exit instructions, etc.) and thus require a
setup phase to sanitize the instruction operands before execution. For mem-
ory instructions, we do not handle segmentation faults that arise from bad
programming, but rather those due to “undefined” values that may appear
in the memory address operand when the transaction condition is not sat-
isfied. Early termination impacts the observed program trace and could be
secret dependent, thus leaking secret data. We mitigate early termination
by suppressing the termination behavior and setting the value of PCpriv to
⊥, thus allowing program execution to proceed without further updates to
program state. We say a PCpriv whose value is set to ⊥ is “stuck”.
Control Flow Transactions As compared with other types of transac-
tions, control flow transactions are not concerned with manipulating program
data, but with maintaining secret-dependent control flow information when
executing the generated SLC binary. We do this by maintaining the secret-
dependent state in PCpriv at each program control flow point. Therefore, a
control flow transaction emulates its corresponding control flow instruction
by updating PCpriv accordingly at runtime.
The most common control flow instructions are intra-function direct jumps;
we provide their transaction pseudocode in Figure 6.3d. We emulate them
by conditionally choosing the target PC based on the flag state using a cmov
instruction (line 11), and then conditionally updating the PCpriv if the trans-
action condition holds (line 16). The target PC values (used on lines 9,10)
are constants provided by the instruction metadata in the DOPE. As for inter-
function direct jumps, they are similar to direct inter-function calls except
they do not modify the stack, so we handle them similarly.
Handling inter-function calls can be done by removing the call, inlining
the function basic blocks, and emulating the call program stack manipula-
tion. However, unrolling and inlining nested functions is unnecessary and
highly space inefficient - especially when functions can be called from mul-
tiple places. Instead, we keep the functions rolled, replace calls with an
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unconditional jumps, and track return target PCs using the SS. We then
emulate the call behavior by conditionally updating the program stack (i.e.
push the return PC target) and updating PCpriv to the call target PC value
when the transaction condition holds.
Functions can also have multiple return sites, and thus cause unwanted
early function returns that impact program functionality. We eliminate these
return sites, and instead emulate them by conditionally updating the program
stack and PCpriv. Then, we instrument a return at the end of the function
to the return target stored on the SS. This way, function calls and returns
are always taken secret-independently, and the program stack is condition-
ally updated, achieving secret-independent SLC without having to incur an
exponential code blowup from unrolling, duplicating and inlining function
code.
Intra-function calls are recursive calls and, similarly, intra-SCC calls (i.e.,
calls to another member function within the same SCC). These calls have
the same emulation logic as inter-function calls and returns, but without the
jumping behavior as that’s taken care of with the SCC’s Rep construct. Fi-
nally, we handle indirect jumps and calls by reducing them to a sequence of
direct jumps and calls to the static target addresses provided by the instruc-
tion metadata in the DOPE (stored on the NV-SP). If the value of the actual
target address at runtime is not in this set of static target addresses, then
PCpriv will get stuck.
Library Function Calls While we can handle inter-function calls to any
type of function, the function must be statically linked in the binary. Library
functions (e.g. libc), however, are dynamically linked and their assembly code
is only available at runtime - making it impossible to rewrite. To overcome
this issue, we propose using Link Time Optimization (LTO) to statically
link library functions and enable instrumenting them. However, even with
LTO there are library functions that inherently leak secret information, such
as I/O functions, which cannot be made data-oblivious. Currently we do
not implement the LTO feature; we instead conditionally call into library
functions when the transaction condition holds. We claim that this does not
conceptually undermine our approach since a library function is just another
binary level function, which we have shown to handle successfully.
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6.2.5 MemOblivious Transactions
Allocation Transactions To achieve MemOblivious execution, we pre-
allocate dynamic heap memory and store heap object pointers in the NV-SP
at the start of main. For every dynamic instance of each program allocation
site, we allocated a heap object as indicated in the DOPE, and maintain a map
in the NV-SP from each allocation site instance to the address of the heap
object. To keep track of dynamic instance encounters, we also maintain a
counter for each allocation site in the V-SP, incrementing it each time the site
is reached at runtime. At every allocation site (e.g. malloc, realloc, etc.), we
remove the function call and replace it with the allocation transaction shown
in Figure 6.4a. This transaction indexes into the allocation instance map,
returns the corresponding heap object address and increments the allocation
site’s dynamic instance counter if the transaction condition holds. We remove
all deallocation calls (e.g. frees) and defer them to the end of the program.
Memory Transactions The second step to achieving MemOblivious ex-
ecution is constructing a transaction for memory access instructions that
transforms each memory access into a sequence of accesses to a list of ad-
dresses provided by the DOPE. In the DOPE, each access address is represented
as an offset into a memory object MemObj, where each MemObj is represented
by an base-address in a memory region and a size. For accesses to objects in
the Globals memory region, the addresses are determined statically at com-
pile time since both the addresses to the global regions as well as the object
offsets are determined at compile time. On the other hand, for accesses to
Stack and Heap objects, while offsets are determined at compile time and
stored in the DOPE, the heap and stack base addresses are determined at
runtime, and thus the absolute addresses of accesses need to be determined
dynamically relative to the stack/heap base. Therefore, we construct the sets
containing absolute memory addresses at the start of main and at runtime,
and store a mapping in the NV-SP from each memory instruction to a list
of memory addresses. Then, we transform each memory access instruction
into a sequence of accesses to the list of addresses stored in the NV-SP using
a looping construct. Each access is itself a transaction that updates pro-



















18 #cond. inc. counter
19 mov .sp_ctr,%r8





























20 #unrolled loop body
21 #exec instruction (.foo)
22 lea .foo, %r9






29 #exec instruction (.bar)
30 lea .bar, %r9



















Figure 6.4: Memory Oblivious Transactions Pseudocodes.
For simplicity, we unroll the loop body and use static addresses instead of
extracting them from the map stored in NV-SP.
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(accessAddr == actualAddr) hold, as shown on lines 23, 31 in Figure 6.4b.
If the value of the actual memory address at runtime is not in this set of





To prove Oblivious [PC] we must show that the PC trace of a program execu-
tion is independent of the secret input at every point in the program’s execu-
tion. Specifically, we want to show that the PCpub remains secret-independent
throughout the whole program. We do this using a proof by induction. We
show that PCpub is solely a function of data stored in the NV-SP and SS,2
and how both those memory regions remain secret-independent throughout
program execution. Our proof of induction is done at the granularity of
BinCloak constructs and transactions.
Base Case All data stored in the NV-SP are secret-independent as indicated
by the DOPE. The SS is empty. Both the PCpub and PCpriv point to the first
instruction transaction in main. The program initialization and setup (before
reaching main) is secret-independent.
Inductive Hypothesis We assume that the PCpub and all variables in the
NV-SP and SS are secret-independent up to completing the transaction of
instruction i.
Inductive Step Given the secret-independent program state after instruc-
tion transaction i, we prove that the execution of the instruction transaction
i+1, for each possible case, maintains the secret-independent state of PCpub,
NV-SP and SS.
2NV-SP is for storing secret-independent data, V-SP is for storing temporary data of all
types (secret,public), and SS is the shadow stack that keeps track of secret-independent
control flow.
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• Compute and Memory Transaction
Compute and memory instruction transactions do not exhibit any control-
flow properties and never directly influencing PCpub. We can see that
in Figures 6.3a and 6.3b, where they are purely SLC that store and
conditionally restore program state, modifying only the V-SP2, using
data-oblivious cmov instructions. Thus, the NV-SP and SS are never
accessed or modified.
• Early Termination Transaction
Early termination transactions eliminate and suppress early termina-
tion behavior, removing its original influence of the program counter,
and thus eliminating its influence on PCpub. Figure 6.3c shows that it
instead sets the value of PCpriv to ⊥ using SLC that stores and restores
program state from V-SP, leaving the PCpub, NV-SP and SS untouched.
• Intra-function Jump Transaction
Intra-function jump transactions remove the branching behavior of
jumps with targets within the same function, eliminating their influ-
ence on PCpub. Figure 6.3d shows that these transactions emulate the
branching behavior of jumps with SLC using cmov instructions by only
modifying PCpriv based on program register state, or by setting it to ⊥
when an indirect jump target is not found in the indirect jump target
set. It does not influence PCpub nor modify the NV-SP and SS.
• Looping Construct
The looping construct is the first source of explicit control flow instru-
mented by BinCloak, i.e. that directly influence PCpub. It is introduced
for program loops, recursions, rep instruction prefixes, and within mem-
ory oblivious transactions (in Section 7.2). The loop bounds are con-
stant secret-independent values provided by the DOPE and stored on
the NV-SP, which is secret-independent (inductive hypothesis), and are
copied onto the SS for every dynamic instance of a loop. Therefore,
the looping construct evaluates and iterates over a sequence of basic
blocks in a secret-independent fashion, influencing the PCpub as such,
and modifies the SS with secret-independent data without modifying
the NV-SP.
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• Inter-function Call/Jump Transaction
Inter-function call transactions are the second source of control flow in
our design. Using SLC, they conditionally update the program stack,
set PCpriv, unconditionally push the PCpub onto the SS and finally jump
to the function. Thus, the SS is modified with secret-independent infor-
mation, the PCpub (inductive hypothesis). In addition, since function
calls are unconditionally taken at every call site to statically prede-
fined locations, the branching behavior influence the PCpub in a secret-
independent way.
SCC recursive calls are handled similar to inter-function calls, updating
the SS secret-independently, but without a jump, thus they exhibit no
branching behavior and do not influence PCpub. Inter-function jumps
are similar to calls as well in that they influence PCpub, but they do
not update the program stack, and thus are handled similarly. Indirect
calls and jumps are simply a sequence of the discussed inter-function
transactions, and thus hold the same security properties. The NV-SP is
neither modified nor used in this transaction.
• Program Function Return Transaction
A program function return transaction removes the branching behavior
of function returns (including SCC returns) and emulates them by con-
ditionally updating both the program stack and PCpriv by using SLC
and modifying the V-SP. This transaction does not influence PCpub, as
it does not exhibit any branching behavior, or modify the NV-SP and
SS.
• ShadowStack Return Transaction
SS returns are the third source of control flow in our design. They
unconditionally pop the head of the SS, where a target address is stored,
and jump to it. As both the PCpub and SS are a function of secret-
independent information (inductive hypothesis), the SS is modified and
the PCpub is influenced in a secret-independent way. The NV-SP is
neither modified nor used in this transaction.
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7.2 Memory Oblivious
To prove Oblivious [Mem] we extend the proof of induction in Section 7.1
by augmenting the base case, inductive hypothesis and inductive step with
relevant memory instruction components. Specifically, we want to show that
both the program memory layout (MemL) and trace (MemT) remain secret-
independent throughout program execution, while still maintaining secret-
independence of PCpub, NV-SP and SS.
Base Case The memory initialization setup at the start of main allocates
heap objects and constructs static memory address sets for each memory
instruction, storing heap object pointers and address sets in NV-SP. Since
heap object allocation is secret-independent and only based on MemObj size
metadata provided by the DOPE, and the stack and global memory regions are
static, the MemL produced is secret-independent. Similarly, memory address
sets are also secret-independent as they rely on static offsets into fixed mem-
ory MemObjs (as indicated in the DOPE). Therefore, by the end of the setup
at the start of main, the PCpub, NV-SP and SS, MemL and MemT are solely a
function of public input.
Inductive Hypothesis We assume that the MemL, MemT, PCpub and all
variables in the NV-SP and SS are secret-independent up to completing mem-
ory transaction of instruction i.
Inductive Step We prove that the execution of the next memory instruc-
tion transaction i+1 maintains the secret-independent state of MemL, MemT,
PCpub, NV-SP and SS.
• Memory Transaction
For MemOblivious, as shown in Figure 6.4b, a memory instruction
transforms into a sequence of memory transactions to secret-independent
memory addresses stored in the NV-SP, which is secret-independent (in-
ductive hypothesis). These memory transactions are implemented in-
side a looping construct which iterates over a fixed secret-independent
number of memory addresses stored in the NV-SP, similar to the loop-
ing constructs in Section 7.1, thus influencing PCpub and SS in a secret-
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independent way. The sequence of the transactions are statically or-
dered in the binary’s code, thus creating the same secret-independent
MemT for a given memory instruction across different inputs. Aug-
mented with PCSecure, which provides a fixed ordering of all memory
instructions, the MemT of the whole program is then fixed and secret-
independent. The MemL is not impacted by this transaction.
• Memory Allocation Function Calls
Memory allocation function calls (i.e., malloc, realloc, calloc) are re-
moved and replaced with SLC instrumentations that returns a secret-
independent heap address that was computed at the start of main and
stored in the NV-SP, without modifying MemL. Memory deallocation
function calls (i.e. frees) are eliminated completely, and so do not
modify MemL either. Thus, memory allocation calls do not impact the
MemL, MemT, PCpub, NV-SP or SS- maintaining their secret-independence.
7.3 Dynamic Analysis Imprecisions and Soundness
Soundness To further reason about the security implications of our work,
we define a notion of soundness. We say our approach is sound for a given ob-
servability function View if the transformed program satisfies Oblivious [View].
In other words, our approach is sound if it produces data-oblivious binaries.
It is important to note that Oblivious [View], as defined in Definition 3.1,
reasons about a program’s security when it is running in isolation, thus it is
sufficient to consider a program with data-oblivious program behavior and
yet secret-dependent output to be sound. We define this as local soundness.
On the other hand, program binaries do not commonly run in isolation,
but they run as part of a system, in collaboration with other binaries (i.e.
the output of one is the input of another). Thus, unsafe binaries that ex-
ecute on the output of locally sound binaries can be the source of leakage.
To avoid this, we assume that all collaborating binaries are locally sound,
and thus there is no unsafe program behavior that will leak their secret in-
put. However, if a locally sound binary produces a functionally incorrect
output that eventually causes a secret-dependent observable behavior (i.e.
binary re-execution, system restart) during validation at the end of the sys-
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tem execution (e.g. output checker, human eye), we say this violates global
soundness.
Analysis Imprecision Our approach guarantees local soundness, but can-
not guarantee global soundness due to the nature of dynamic analysis, where
imprecisions may arise in different program parameters that can impact
the functionality of the instrumented binary. Such parameters include loop
bounds, recursion depth, memory address sets, and indirect jump and call
target sets. Imprecision in these parameters can cause the PCpriv to get
“stuck”, and hinder global soundness. The PCpriv getting stuck will result in
the program state never making forward progress as program execution con-
tinues until completion. However, this does generate a secret-independent PC
and memory trace identical to that of executing on other inputs. Therefore,
we argue that in the event of a stuck PCpriv, and as a result of generat-





In this chapter, we evaluate the design of BinCloak with the aim to answer
the following research questions:
RQ1 How well can the transformed, data-oblivious binaries handle executing
unseen inputs? Can they achieve full test coverage when executed over
a set of test inputs?
RQ2 What are the performance and size overheads of these data-oblivious
binaries?
To answer RQ1 and RQ2, and to evaluate the effectiveness of our analysis
strategy, e.g., to infer loop bounds and memory access sets, we use BinCloak
to transform a set of benchmark applications that form the core of many
real-world, security sensitive applications, and that were also used for evalu-
ation by prior work [22, 62]. In addition to the aforementioned benchmarks,
we study the use of BinCloak to harden vulnerable cryptographic implemen-
tations in two popular COTS libraries: (1) T-Table AES as implemented in
OpenSSL v3.0, and (2) modular exponentiation based RSA using the Chi-
nese Remainder Theorem (CRT) as implemented in Libgcrypt v1.8.5 with
blinding techniques disabled. A list of all the benchmarks, and their public
and secret inputs, is given in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Overview of Benchmark Public and Secret Inputs.
Benchmark Public Inputs Secret Inputs
Binary Search Array Size Array Content, Search Element
Bubble Sort Array Size Array Content
Merge Sort Array Size Array Content
Find Max Array Size Array Content
Matrix Multiply Dimensions of matrix Matrix Content
Dijkstra # Nodes Graph Structure, Edge Weights
Kmeans # Points, # Clusters Placement of points in space
(CS-I) T-AES (OpenSSL) Plaint Text Size, Key Size (in bits) Plain Text, Key
(CS-II) RSA (Libgcrypt) Plaint Text Size, Key Size (in bits) Plain Text, Key
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8.1 Evaluation Setup and Methodology
Setup We evaluated BinCloak on a Intel Xeon 2.50GHz machine, run-
ning Ubuntu 18.04. All binaries reported in the evaluation were compiled
into x86-64 using gcc v7.4.0 and -O2 optimization level. For the case stud-
ies, we isolate and compile T-Table AES, as implemented in OpenSSL v3.0
rijndael-alg-fst.c, and RSA as implemented in Libgcrypt v1.8.5 rsa.c.
To drive execution, we write a small driver with a main function to read keys
from file and call into the corresponding benchmark functions.
Input Generation For each benchmark, a fixed number of inputs (4096)
are sampled by reading bytes from a source of randomness: /dev/urandom
on Linux. As for RSA, we use this source of randomness to generate real,
well formed, input keys. These inputs are then split into two sets: 80%
form the analysis set, used for analyzing and transforming the binary, and
the remainder 20% form the test set (i.e. unseen inputs), and are used to
evaluate the data-oblivious binary and determine its test coverage. The above
method of generating inputs is akin to a simple blackbox fuzzer that does not
take into account any program or execution properties, but rather generates
independent inputs uniformly at random. In our evaluations, we found this
strategy to be effective, and that 4096 inputs were sufficient for achieving full
test coverage for all benchmarks, given that the test inputs are from the same
random distribution. We believe this is sufficient for producing robust and
indicative results, and we leave further evaluations on more comprehensive
input distributions for future work.
Test Coverage Evaluation Methodology To study the effect of anal-
ysis inputs on achieving full test coverage, and to determine the point of
convergence, i.e., the point at which there is 100% test coverage, we split the
analysis set into 20 subsets of 164 inputs each. We then iteratively generate
20 data-oblivious binaries, where binary i includes the analysis of all input
subsets 0...i, and evaluate their execution on the complete test set. The data-
oblivious binaries satisfy both PCSecure and MemOblivious. We do not split
the analysis because our benchmarks require only a small number of analy-
sis inputs to satisfy PCSecure, as we will explain in our evaluation analysis
in Section 8.2. We say an execution of binary i “passes” on test input j iff
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the execution completes with the correct output on test input j, otherwise
it “fails”. We then, for each data-oblivious binary i, determine the test cov-
erage by computing the percentage of test inputs that pass. Finally, we use
these results to graph the test coverage rate as a function of the number of
analysis inputs.
Table 8.2: Benchmark Public Input Variations for Scalability Evaluation.
Benchmark
Public Input Variation
1 2 3 4 5
Binary Search 64 128 256 512 1024
Bubble Sort 64 128 256 512 1024
Dijkstra 8 16 32 64 128
Find Max 64 128 256 512 1024
Merge Sort 16 32 64 128 256
Kmeans 2/64 4/128 8/256 16/512 32/1024
Matrix Multiply 4 8 16 32 64
T-AES Encrypt 128 bits
T-AES Decrypt 128 bits
RSA Encrypt 4096 bits
RSA Decrypt 4096 bits
Overhead Evaluation Methodology For each benchmark, we evalua-
tion the execution time and size of the data-oblivious binary transformed
using the largest analysis set (3277 inputs), and thus 100% test coverage, by
comparing it with that of the original binary to get the overhead. We do
this overhead analysis for both the PCSecure and MemOblivious models. In
addition, to evaluate scalability, i.e. how overheads scale with the increase
of public input size, we compare the overheads of each benchmark across
variations of public input size as indicated in Table 8.2. We do not vary the
public input size of case studies as key size variations are limited.
We measure the execution time for each binary by executing it on each
test input 128 times and selecting the fastest time (the least noisy). Then
we sum up the total fastest time across all inputs. To get a strict fine-grain
timing measurement of the execution we instrument rdtsc before and after
the call to the primary algorithm’s function, thus measuring the time at
cycle granularity and filtering out unnecessary noise (e.g., fixed overheads
of loading/unloading the binary, reading inputs from file, etc.). We disable
dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) to eliminate its effects on
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varying the cycle time. As for size overhead, we compare the sizes of the
data-oblivious binary and original binary in bytes.
8.2 Benchmarks Evaluation
8.2.1 Test Coverage Results
PCSecure Analysis PCSecure binaries of these benchmarks achieve full
test coverage with a small number of inputs because their loop bounds and
other control flow statements are easily approximated. Looking at the bench-
mark pseudocodes in Figure 8.1, loop bounds either directly depend on the
fixed public input (e.g. Bubble Sort, Find Max), or also rely on the secret
input but the worst case can approximated with a small number of inputs
(e.g. Binary Search, Kmeans). Similarly, control flow is generally simple:
there are no indirect jumps, indirect calls, or corner-case conditional state-
ments. Therefore, we focus our analysis on achieving full test coverage of
data-oblivious binaries that satisfy both PCSecure and MemOblivious mod-
els, which reduces to that of MemOblivious.
MemOblivious Analysis To achieve full test coverage for binaries under
the MemOblivious model, we need to get full coverage of all memory address
sets. We define coverage of a memory address set in terms of a golden set, the
set of locations that would be constructed for a given memory access if the
test set was used as the analysis set, and thus achieving a 100% test coverage.
The golden set may be as large as the number of all possible addresses that
can be seen by a given memory access, depending on the benchmark (e.g.
no corner cases) and the test set inputs (i.e., representative of input space).
As such, we will focus our analysis on the critical memory accesses in the
benchmarks, those that require the most analysis until convergence and those
shaded in gray in Figure 8.1, to understand how to achieve coverage over them
and how it impacts the test coverage seen in Figure 8.2.
We can see in Figure 8.2 that these benchmarks can be categorized into
three types of MemOblivious test coverage behavior: (1) progressive, (2) in-
stantaneous, and (3) near-instantaneous. The first type, progressive, includes
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1 void Binary_Search(int arr[],int l, int r, int x) {
2 while (l <= r) {
3 int m = l + (r - l) / 2;
4 if (arr[m] == x) return m;
5 if (arr[m] < x) l = m + 1;





1 void Bubble_Sort(int arr[],int N) {
2 for(int i=0;i<N-1;i++)
3 for(int j=0;j<N-i-1;j++)
4 if (arr[j] > arr[j + 1])
5 swap(&arr[j], &arr[j + 1]);
6 }
(b) Bubble Sort
1 int Find_Max(int arr[], int N) {
2 int max_val = INT_MIN;
3 for (int i = 0; i < N; i++)
4 if (arr[i] > max_val)




1 void Matrix_Multiply(int *A, int *B, int *C,int N) {
2 for (int i = 0; i < N; i++)
3 for (int j = 0; j < N; j++)
4 for (int k = 0; k < N; k++)
5 C[i*N + j] += A[i*N + k] * B[k*N + j];
6 }
(d) Matrix Multiply
1 void Dijkstra(Graph *graph, int src, int *dist) {
2 for (int i = 0; i < nVertices; i++)
3 dist[i] = INT_MAX;
4 dist[src] = 0;
5
6 PQ pq; //priority queue
7 Init_PQ(&pq, nVertices*nVertices, 2);
8 int src_node[2] = {src, 0};
9 Push_PQ(&pq, src_node);
10
11 while (pq.size > 0) {
12 int top_node[2] = {0, 0};
13 Top_PQ(&pq, top_node);
14 Pop_PQ(&pq);
15 int u = top_node[0];
16
17 for (int i=0; i<graph->nOutDegrees[u]; i++) {
18 int v = graph->adjlist[u][i];
19 int weight = graph->weights[u][i];
20 if (dist[v] > dist[u] + weight) {
21 dist[v] = dist[u] + weight;







1 static int *buf_L = (int *)malloc(sizeof(int) * N);
2 static int *buf_R = (int *)malloc(sizeof(int) * N);
3 void Merge(int arr[], int l, int m, int r) {
4 int len_L = m - l + 1;
5 int len_R = r - m;
6
7 for (int i=0;i<len_L;i++) buf_L[i]=arr[l+i];
8 for (int j=0;j<len_R;j++) buf_R[j]=arr[m+1+j];
9
10 int i = 0, j = 0, k = l;
11 while (i<len_L && j<len_R) {
12 if (buf_L[i] <= buf_R[j]) {
13 arr[k]=buf L[i]; i++;
14 } else {




19 while (i<len_L) {
20 arr[k]=buf_L[i]; i++; k++;
21 }
22 while (j<len_R) {
23 arr[k]=buf_R[j]; j++; k++;
24 }
25 }
26 void Merge_Sort(int arr[], int l, int r) {
27 if (l<r) {
28 int m = l + (r - l) / 2;
29 Merge_Sort(arr, l, m);
30 Merge_Sort(arr, m + 1, r);




1 int Kmeans(int dim, int nc, int np, float **data,
2 float err, float **cntrds, int *lbls) {
3 float ptd = 0; // prev dist
4 float ctd = FLT_MAX; //curr dist
5 int *clstrsz = (int *)malloc(nc*sizeof(int));
6
7 for (int i = 0; i < nc; i++)
8 for (int j = 0; j < dim; j++)
9 cntrds[i][j] = data[i][j];
10
11 while ( fabs(ctd - ptd) > err ) {
12 ptd = ctd; ctd = 0;
13 for (int i = 0; i < np; i++) {
14 float min_dist = FLT_MAX;
15 for (int j = 0; j < nc; j++) {
16 float dist = 0;
17 for (int k = 0; k < dim; k++)
18 dist += pow(data[i][k]-cntrds[j][k],2);
19 if (dist < min_dist)
20 lbls[i] = j; min_dist=dist;
21 }
22 ctd += min_dist;
23 }
24 for (int i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
25 clstrsz[i] = 0;
26 for (int j = 0; j < dim; j++)
27 cntrds[i][j] = 0.0;
28 }
29 for (int i = 0; i < np; i++) {
30 clstrsz[lbls[i]]++;
31 for (int j = 0; j < dim; j++)
32 cntrds[lbls[i]][j] += data[i][j];
33 }
34 for (int i = 0; i < nc; i++)
35 for (int j = 0; j < dim; j++)
36 cntrds[i][j] = clstrsz[i] ?






Figure 8.1: Benchmark C Pseudocode.
The yellow-shaded code indicates secret-dependent loop bounds, while the
gray-shaded code indicates critical memory accesses that highly influence the
behavior of benchmark test coverage in Figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2: Benchmark Test Coverage Growth with Analysis Set Size.
Binary Search and Find Max, and is one that requires a relatively large set
of analysis inputs. This is because the control flow in these benchmarks lim-
its the number of memory addresses seen for the critical accesses during the
execution of an input, and thus requires the analysis of a larger set of inputs
to achieve full memory address set coverage. Taking Find Max for example,
the condition statement on line 4 needs to be satisfied for each iteration,
i.e., an intermediate maximum element needs to be found at every index,
to achieve full address set coverage for the gray shaded memory access on
line 5. In practice, with larger arrays of randomly generated data, satisfying
such a condition completely is difficult with a small set of inputs, which is
why we observe a logarithmic increase in the test coverage as we increase the
number of analysis set inputs. The ideal, yet unlikely, analysis input that
would achieve this in a single run is an array sorted in ascending order.
Benchmarks in the instantaneous category achieve full test coverage as
a result of a small analysis set, such as Bubble Sort, Matrix Multiply and
Kmeans. In the case of Matrix Multiply, it is because the algorithm is al-
ready data oblivious, and thus memory address sets trivially converge. On
the other hand, Bubble Sort and Kmeans converge because the control flow
enables critical memory accesses to discover their golden set with high prob-
ability. In Bubble Sort, for example, the critical memory accesses are in the
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swap function, which converge when swaps between all adjacent indices are
detected on line 10 in Figure 8.1b. For this to happen, the conditional state-
ment on line 9 needs to be satisfied for every index j at least once. This
is highly probable since not satisfying an index j means the array is sorted
from indices [j...N-1], which is unlikely (even among a small set of analysis
inputs).
The remaining benchmarks are of the third and final type, near-instantaneous,
which achieve a high test coverage (greater than 90%) from a small analysis
set, but require a large number of inputs to capture every single path and
corner case. Take for example Dijkstra, where a table update for every pos-
sible node-neighbor path needs to occur on line 27 in Figure 8.1e to achieve
full coverage. While this is certainly possible, it is unlikely we can capture
all update combinations with a small set of analysis inputs, but highly likely
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(d) MemOblivious Size Overhead
Figure 8.3: Benchmark Performance and Size Overheads across Public Input
Variations.
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Sources of Overhead The performance overhead is a result of three fac-
tors: transactions, loop bounds, and conditional statements. Overhead oc-
curs when discrepancies arise between the original and data-oblivious bina-
ries in one or more of these factors, and the discrepancy in each factor may
change with a variation in public input. Both PCSecure and MemOblivious
have transactions overhead, which is the result of the instrumentation of
transactions into the binary that increases the number of instructions. It
depends on a binary’s instruction profile (i.e. % memory instructions and %
compute instructions) as the overhead is larger for memory instructions than
compute instructions. For both instruction types, however, the overhead is
constant across all public inputs. For MemOblivious, the main factor is the
memory transaction overhead introduced by the instrumented memory scans
and the size of the memory address set, which create a large discrepancy
with the original binary which accesses a single memory location.
The two latter factors, loop bounds and conditional statements, mainly
impact the PCSecure overhead. Loop bounds overhead arises when there is
a discrepancy in loop bound complexity. It is the difference between the
loop bound complexity of the original binary, which is the average case, and
that of the data-oblivious binary, which is the worst case (and sometimes
more). Finally, conditional statements overhead occurs because all paths
of a conditional statement are executed in the data-oblivious binary, which
is not the case in the original binary. It depends on the structure of the
statements (e.g. if-then, if-else, switch), and their branch behavior profile
(i.e. frequency of taken/not-taken). For example, an if-then that is rarely
executed in the original binary will result in an overhead when one that
always executes will not, and an if-else will always result in an overhead
as an extra is always executed.
PCSecure Performance Overhead Analysis For PCSecure performance
overhead in Figure 8.3a, we can distinguish between three different cate-
gories of benchmarks: (1) those with constant overhead that mostly incur
transactions overhead, (2) those with small discrepancies in control flow and
result in modest overheads that vary with the public input, and (3) those
with large discrepancies and incur larger overheads that vary significantly
with the public input. Benchmarks in the first category that incur a con-
stant overhead include Binary Search, Bubble Sort and Matrix Multiply.
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These benchmark have identical loop bound complexity between the original
and data-oblivious binary, and negligible discrepancies in conditional state-
ments behavior. However, the constant transactions overhead can vary across
benchmarks depending on the transaction types that prevail during execu-
tion. For example, Binary Search has a lower overhead than Matrix Multiply
as the former is mostly compute transactions and the latter is mostly memory
transactions.
Find Max and Kmeans fall under the second category, where they incur
small loop bound and/or conditional statements overhead that vary with
public input. Find Max has discrepancies in conditional statements behavior
between the original data-oblivious binary, where the if-then statement on
line 4 in Figure 8.1c is taken a relatively much smaller number of times in the
original binary, and the amount of time it’s taken monotonically decreases
as the array size increases. Thus, we see an increase in overhead as public
input increases. While Kmeans incurs both conditional statements and loop
bound overheads, only the main loop (shaded yellow in Figure 8.1g) causes
variations, and they’re only noticeable for large public inputs.
On the other hand, Merge Sort and Dijkstra incur large PCSecure over-
heads mostly due to loop bound complexity discrepancies between the orig-
inal and data-oblivious binaries. Dijkstra incurs a large linear complexity
difference between the binaries in the main loop shaded yellow in Figure 8.1e,
and a large difference in the behavior of the if-then statement on line 26.
Merge Sort, however, has an exponential difference in loop bound complex-
ity which arises due to our conservative recursive depth handling approach
discussed in Section 6.1.2, causing a substantial amount of overhead which
varies significantly with the public input.
MemOblivious Performance Overhead Analysis As for MemOblivious
performance overhead, all the benchmarks in Figure 8.1 have secret-dependent
memory accesses with large memory address sets, most of which scale linearly
with the public input, except Djikstra, which scales quadratically. Similar to
PCSecure, the MemOblivious overhead also depends on the transaction type,
specifically for those benchmarks with more memory instructions. Therefore
we notice in Figure 8.3b, for example, that the overhead of memory inten-
sive benchmarks such as Matrix Multiply incur a larger blowup in overhead
when MemOblivious is enabled as compared to those of compute intensive
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benchmarks like Binary Search. While the MemOblivious overhead mostly
overpowers PCSecure overheads, we can still see the effects of PCSecure over-
heads between benchmarks that exhibit similar memory access behavior but
different control flow behavior, as in Find Max and Bubble Sort.
Size Overhead Analysis For PCSecure we see a constant size overhead
in Figure 8.3c for all benchmarks. This is due to the instrumentation of
transactions, which does not changes across input variations since only loop
bound values change. However, with MemOblivious, memory address sets are
augmented to the binary and their size heavily impact that of the binary. For
most benchmarks the memory address set size grows linearly as a function of
the public input size, and thus so does the binary size. For Dijkstra, however,
the growth of memory address sets of a few instructions is quadratic with
the input size. This is reflected in the size overheads in Figure 8.3d.
8.3 Case Study I: T-Table AES
We evaluate BinCloak on OpenSSL’s T-Table AES implementation, for
both encrypt and decrypt, using a 128-bit key and one 128-bit block of
plaintext. We will refer to the implementation of AES Encrypt, as shown
in Figure 8.4, in our analysis as it applies to both the encrypt and decrypt
implementations, unless otherwise stated.
Key-dependent Memory Accesses in T-Table AES T-Tables are an
optimization over traditional S-Box AES, which combine and pre-compute
the SubBytes (S-Box lookup) and MixColumns steps into four lookup tables
of 1024 bytes, speeding up the computation in software. Figure 8.4 code
snippet shows the OpenSSL implementation of T-Table AES for a key of size
128 bits, which results in a total of 10 rounds. We can see that secret key and
plaintext dependent intermediate variables (s0-s3,t0-t3) are used as indices
for memory accesses into the T-Tables on lines 21-28,38-45, and 50-61.
Test Coverage Analysis For T-Table AES, achieving full test coverage
for PCSecure is trivial as the loop bound is fixed and there is no input-
dependent control flow. As for MemOblivious, the algorithm consists of 48
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1 // Lookup Tables
2 uint32 T0[256] = {...}
3 uint32 T1[256] = {...}
4 uint32 T2[256] = {...}
5 uint32 T3[256] = {...}




10 // Add the first round key
11 s0 = ptxt[0] ^ key[0];
12 s1 = ptxt[1] ^ key[1];
13 s2 = ptxt[2] ^ key[2];
14 s3 = ptxt[3] ^ key[3];
15
16 // Main loop, does 2 rounds per iteration
17 int rounds = 5; // total 10 rounds for 128 bit key
18 while(1) {
19 // Rounds 1,3,5,7,9:
20 // SubBytes + ShiftRows + MixColumns + AddRoundKey
21 t0 = T0[s0>>24] ^ T1[s1>>16&0xff]
22 ^ T2[s2>>8&0xff] ^ T3[s3&0xff] ^ key[4]
23 t1 = T0[s1>>24] ^ T1[s2>>16&0xff]
24 ^ T2[s3>>8&0xff] ^ T3[s0&0xff] ^ key[5]
25 t2 = T0[s2>>24] ^ T1[s3>>16&0xff]
26 ^ T2[s0>>8&0xff] ^ T3[s1&0xff] ^ key[6]
27 t3 = T0[s3>>24] ^ T1[s0>>16&0xff]
28 ^ T2[s1>>8&0xff] ^ T3[s2&0xff] ^ key[7]
29
30 key += 8 // re-index key
31 rounds -= 1




36 // Rounds 2,4,6,8:
37 // SubBytes + ShiftRows + MixColumns + AddRoundKey
38 s0 = T0[t0>>24] ^ T1[t1>>16&0xff]
39 ^ T2[t2>>8&0xff] ^ T3[t3&0xff] ^ key[0]
40 s1 = T0[t1>>24] ^ T1[t2>>16&0xff]
41 ^ T2[t3>>8&0xff] ^ T3[t0&0xff] ^ key[1]
42 s2 = T0[t2>>24] ^ T1[t3>>16&0xff]
43 ^ T2[t0>>8&0xff] ^ T3[t1&0xff] ^ key[2]
44 s3 = T0[t3>>24] ^ T1[t0>>16&0xff]




49 // Round 10: SubBytes + ShiftRows + AddRoundKey
50 ctxt[0] = T2[t0>>24]&0xff000000 ^ T3[t1>>16&0xff]&0x00ff0000
51 ^ T0[t2>>8&0xff]&0x0000ff00 ^ T1[t3&0xff]&0x000000ff
52 ^ key[0]
53 ctxt[1] = T2[t1>>24]&0xff000000 ^ T3[t2>>16&0xff]&0x00ff0000
54 ^ T0[t3>>8&0xff]&0x0000ff00 ^ T1[t0&0xff]&0x000000ff
55 ^ key[1]
56 ctxt[2] = T2[t2>>24]&0xff000000 ^ T3[t3>>16&0xff]&0x00ff0000
57 ^ T0[t0>>8&0xff]&0x0000ff00 ^ T1[t1&0xff]&0x000000ff
58 ^ key[2]
59 ctxt[3] = T2[t3>>24]&0xff000000 ^ T3[t0>>16&0xff]&0x00ff0000




Figure 8.4: OpenSSL’s T-Table AES Encryption Pseudocode.
Decryption is similar, but with different table contents reflecting the inverse
nature of the algorithm, as well as a 5th pre-computed table for the 10th round.
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Figure 8.5: Case Study Test Coverage Growth with Analysis Set Size.
memory accesses to 4 T-Tables, each table with 256 elements. Therefore, for
each memory access, the golden set consists of 256 possible memory locations,
and it is imperative to detect them during analysis to get full coverage. If
input bytes are generated at uniform random, the expected number of indices
needed at each memory access to a T-Table can be theoretically calculated
using the solution for the coupon collector’s problem for size N=256, which
is an expected value of 1568 indices. Empirically, of course, the number of
indices can be higher. It is safe to assume that attaining full coverage for
one memory access is independent of the others, since the intermediate index
variables used to access the T-Tables depend on different bytes of the keys
and the intermediate indices are effectively randomized after each round. As
such, and per single input, we consider each dynamic instance of a memory
access corresponds to an index occurrence, resulting in 5 indices generated
for accesses on lines 20-28, 4 for accesses on lines 38-45, but only 1 index
for those from lines 50-61. Thus, the number of inputs required to achieve
100% test coverage will be equal to the number required to get full coverage
of the critical worst case accesses, those with 1 index per input, which is
an expected number of 1568 indices, reflecting the number of inputs needed
in Figure 8.5 for both AES Encrypt and Decrypt. With a small number of























Figure 8.6: Case Study Performance and Size Overheads.
Overhead Analysis T-Table AES does not have any significant control
flow, and thus the PCSecure overhead depends on the transactions overhead
for both performance and size. Similar to the majority of benchmarks evalu-
ated in the previous section, T-Table AES has a substantial number of both
compute and memory instructions (Figure 8.4), and thus we notice a similar
performance overhead in Figure 8.6. Correspondingly, there is a significant
increase in overhead for MemOblivious as each memory instruction instance
to a T-Table now accesses all 256 elements. The slight difference in overheads
between the encrypt and decrypt functions is because the original encrypt
binary has a slightly higher execution time than that of the original decrypt
binary, but their respective data-oblivious binaries execute at equal speed
as the overheads introduced by our transformations drown out the differ-
ence. As for size overheads, the significant increase in size from PCSecure
to MemOblivious is due to the storage of memory address sets for a large
number of memory instructions. The difference in size overheads between
encrypt and decrypt is because we only instrument functions that can be
reached during dynamic analysis, and decryption initialization functions use
encryption initialization functions but not vice-versa, thus there are more
functions instrumented in the decrypt binary.
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8.4 Case Study II: RSA
Our final evaluation is on Libgcrypt’s cryptography engine, and particularly
their 4096 bit RSA encrypt/decrypt implementations using CRT with blind-
ing disabled. We transform and evaluate this implementation as it would be
used and deployed in a real-world setting. We only modify the decrypt func-
tion to read the source of randomness from file, rather than rdrand, to have
a comparable performance overhead analysis. Libgcrypt RSA encrypt and
decrypt are the largest and most complex of binaries in our evaluation, with
167,529 lines of code across 404 files and hundreds of functions. BinCloak
is able to transform these implementations into data-oblivious binaries with
all their intricacies (e.g. several multiple-entry SCCs as in Figure 4.2, func-
tion pointers, indirect jumps and calls, etc.), and with no benchmark-specific
optimizations or expert knowledge fed to the analyzer.
Test Coverage Analysis The RSA algorithm is merely a series of com-
putations using the key, plaintext and some source of randomness. How-
ever, the implementation in Libgcrypt is complex from a program stand-
point as it involves the whole cryptography engine running at the frontend,
S-expression parsing, inter-dependencies between functions that form SCCs,
function pointers that create indirect calls, large switch statements that cre-
ate indirect jumps, etc. With BinCloak being able to recognize and transform
all these program constructs at the binary level, the evaluation of test cover-
age reduces to whether we are able to sufficiently approximate the necessary
loop bounds, indirect call/jump address sets and memory address sets.
We can see in Figure 8.5 that full test coverage for RSA encrypt and
decrypt is achieved with a small number of analysis inputs. For PCSecure,
that is because loop bounds and indirect control flow is largely dependent on
public data (e.g., the type of encryption), the structure of the input and its
size. For example, indirect calls are to function pointers whose targets are
known based on public inputs. On the other hand, the few loop bounds that
depend on the secret input focus on the number of trailing zeros in bits being
processed. However, it is highly probable to approximate the worst cases of
trailing zeroes with a small number of inputs as these instances are called
from within large nested loops, on various intermediate secret-dependent
computations.
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As for MemOblivious, the secret-dependent data consist of the key and
plaintext, which are large numbers and are thus represented as an array of
integers stored in memory. However, the size of these arrays are relatively
small and fixed to the public size of the key. Therefore, with control flow not
being a barrier and the number of critical memory locations to discover are
small, achieving convergence of memory address sets is not hard and does
not require a large number of inputs.
Overhead Analysis The control flow complexities of RSA imply a large
variety of possible program paths, with lots of conditional statements that
are nested inside loops and SCCs and that include calls to different func-
tions with similar characteristics. As a result, with BinCloak’s conservative
approach of executing all possible program execution paths, the execution is
overwhelmed with the branching of function calls that are eventually masked
out by transactions and produce the high PCSecure overhead in Figure 8.6.
As for MemOblivious, we mentioned that data-dependent memory access are
mostly to the secret inputs, the sizes of which are relatively small and thus
only lead to a 2x increase in overhead over PCSecure. The overhead for
RSA decyrpt is lower than that of the encrypt binary because of file I/O
reads in the decrypt function which deflates the overheads caused by our
data-oblivious transformations. Finally, while the PCSecure size overhead
for Libgcrypt is relatively similar to other benchmarks, we do not see a sim-
ilar overhead increase trend with MemOblivious as the memory address sets




Prior work that examined side-channels at the application binary level fo-
cused primarily on the analysis of these binaries for vulnerability detection
rather than mitigation. CacheAudit [63] uses static analysis to capture an
upper-bound on cache side-channel leakage, however their approach is prone
to have a high false positive rate due to the imprecision of static analysis and
the need for over-approximation. While CacheD [64] relies on dynamic anal-
ysis, namely trace generation and symbolic execution on dynamic traces, to
reduces false positives, it is prone to a high false negative rate as they do not
achieve full path coverage. BinCloak however aims to capture all possible
control flow paths and comprehensive memory access sets, reducing the false
negatives that are due to lack of coverage. More recent work in vulnerability
detection, CaSym [66], compiles source code down to IR and uses only sym-
bolic execution for analysis, however they over-approximate their analysis to
reduce the symbolic execution overhead, which can lead to a loss of precision
and false positives. The work most similar to ours is DATA [65], which uses
dynamic trace generation and analysis to increase control flow path coverage
and gather memory address accesses. While this does not eliminate false
negatives, it reduces them significantly.
Similar to DATA, our approach relies on dynamic trace generation to
achieve path coverage, but we generate a larger number of traces to identify
all unique memory accesses needed to achieve full functionality. More gener-
ally, detection techniques differ from our mitigation strategy in that they can
afford to lose precision for the sake of soundness through over-approximation,
and they only require solving for one counterexample as opposed to all pos-
sible unique solutions. BinCloak requires high precision for performance, as
well as high soundness for functionality - relaxing our precision requirements
would result in significantly large execution overheads. Detection works also
relax the cache model and do not mitigate against the most conservative
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Table 9.1: Related Work.
Tool Granularity Type Threat Model
CacheAudit [63] Binary Detection HW-Cache
CacheD [64] Binary Detection HW-Cache
DATA [65] Binary Detection HW-MTO
CaSym [66] Source/IR Detection HW-Cache
Raccoon [22] Source/IR Mitigation HW-MTO
FaCT [34] Language Mitigation HW-All*
BinCloak Binary Mitigation HW-MTO
cache model, MTO, like BinCloak does. Rather, they target a subset of
common cache models (e.g. LRU, FIFO, PLRU), which would increase the
false negative rate and decrease soundness of these works when evaluated
under MTO.
As for mitigation, all prior work has focused on language and source/IR
level mitigations, while nothing has been done at the binary level. FaCT
[34] creates a domain specific language that achieves constant time code by
mainly obfuscates simple secret-dependent control flow, but it cannot han-
dle and disallows sensitive inputs to flow into loops and memory accesses.
Raccoon [22] achieves data-oblivious execution of applications at the source
level using taint analysis and code injection, however it is extremely limited
as it cannot handle loops, library code, recursion, or break and continue
statements. On the other hand, BinCloak is not limited to any particular
language, does not require access to source code and can handle most pro-
gramming constructs with good precision. Actually, we believe that our work





This work proposed BinCloak, the first automatic framework for transform-
ing COTS binaries into data-oblivious binaries. We defined a new data-
oblivious binary program representation, proposed static and dynamic bi-
nary analysis techniques to construct it, and then used this representation
to transform an unsafe COTS binary. Finally, we showed that we are able
to apply these transformations on large complex binaries of real-world cryp-
tography algorithms to produce data-oblivious binaries. We hope our work
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